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REVIVING PARTICIPANT COMPENSATION 
Carl Tobias* 
Over the last quarter century, Congress has clearly recognized the 
importance of expanding public participation in federal administrative 
agency proceedings. It has expressly required that many agencies solicit 
citizen input and facilitate active public involvement in administrative 
processes while commanding governmental officials to consider thor-
oughly in their decisionmaking the views of all interests that might be 
affected. Congress has attempted to develop some mechanisms for pro-
moting increased citizen participation in agency processes, but the leg-
islative branch has been relatively unsuccessful in actually enhancing 
public involvement. Because citizen participants, such as public interest 
groups or individual consumers, have comparatively few resources for 
participating in administrative decisionmaking, congressional inability 
to promote their involvement has effectively rendered hollow the right 
to participate.1 These phenomena appear to be most problematic in 
rulemaking proceedings, perhaps the preeminent procedure for develop-
ing administrative policy. 
There is, however, one cost-effective measure for facilitating citi-
zen involvement in agency processes with which numerous prior Con-
gresses and several previous administrations have experimented: public 
participation funding.2 Participant compensation was instituted during 
the Republican administrations of Presidents Nixon and Ford, was 
comprehensively experimented with during the Democratic administra-
tion of President Carter, and was applied, albeit more narrowly and in 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. B.A. 1968, Duke University; LL.B. 1972, Univer-
sity of Virginia. I wish to express my thanks to Peggy Sanner for her valuable susgcstions. Any 
errors tha~ remain are mine alone. 
1. Even as then-Judge Warren Burger recognized the right to partieip:itc in administrative 
proceedings, he acknowledged that the costs of participating would limit the number of partici-
pants. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 3S9 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966). 
2. Funding, compensation, and reimbursement arc employed synonymously to mean agency 
payment of the costs and expenses incurred by members of the public when participating in fed-
eral proceedings. 
sos 
506 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:505 
a somewhat altered form, during the Republican administration of 
President Reagan.3 Now that the lOlst Congress and the Bush admin-
istration are confronting the pragmatic realities of governance in the 
modern administrative state, they should seriously consider this valua-
ble technique for promoting participatory democracy to ascertain 
whether participant reimbursement warrants revitalization and, if so, 
how it can be revived most effectively. This article is meant to provoke 
discussion of participant compensation's worth and to stimulate new, 
rigorous experimentation with the concept. 
The first section of this article briefly recounts the origins and de-
velopment of citizen reimbursement and describes experimentation with 
that mechanism. The second part evaluates the benefits and disadvan-
tages of public funding. Because this assessment indicates that the 
measure is a cost-effective approach for improving agency decisionmak-
ing and for enhancing citizen participation in administrative proceed-
ings, the third section offers suggestions for reinstituting participant 
compensation. 
I. THE BACKGROUND OF PARTICIPANT COMPENSATION 
The rise of, and early experimentation with, the participant reim-
bursement concept require only cursory treatment here:' Since the mid-
1960s, numerous observers, as diverse as Ralph Nader, business inter-
ests, and Chicago School economists, have criticized federal adminis-
trative agencies for failing to fulfill their statutorily mandated responsi-
bilities.5 There are many explanations for agency failure, but a number 
3. The Equal Access to Justice Act and resource pools used in regulatory negotiation are two 
prominent forms in which the concept was applied during the Reagan administration. Thorough 
assessment of them, however, is beyond the scope of this article. For a brief treatment of both, see 
Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensation: Government Sponsored Public Par-
ticipation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 110 I, 
1106 & n.29, 1165 n.387 (1986); cf. Perritt, Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: 
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. 
L.J. 1625 (1986) (more treatment of resource pools); Note, Applying The Equal Access to Justice 
Act to Asylum Hearings, 97 YALE L.J. 1459, 1461-76 (1988) (more treatment of Equal Access to 
Justice Act). 
4. For a more thorough analysis, see Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: 
Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative 
Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 907-18 (1982); Tobias, supra note 3, at 1102-17. For a 
broader examination of the problems reimbursement was intended to rectify, see Diver, Poli-
cymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981); Stewart, The Refor-
mation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975). 
5. For a thorough analysis of agency failure, sees. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 130-81 (2d ed. 1985). 
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of the reasons allude to the participatory disparities in administrative 
processes between regulated entities and the public at large.6 When 
agency decisionmakers premise judgments primarily on data and argu-
ments that industry members supply, it should not be surprising that 
the governmental determinations ultimately reached substantially re-
flect these entities' viewpoints.7 An important explanation for the sig-
nificant discrepancies in participation between regulated interests and 
the public is the considerable costs of participating in agency proceed-
ings.8 These considerations led some observers to suggest that, if citi-
zens could improve administrative processes by offering more balanced 
information and different perspectives, but were prevented from doing 
so because they lacked the requisite resources, agencies should facili-
tate their involvement by providing financial assistance.9 Participant re-
imbursement was an important mechanism created to ameliorate or 
remedy these perceived difficulties with modern administrative 
government.10 
Approximately two decades ago, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Administrative Conference of the United States 
(ACUS) began studying concepts that were the forerunners of the 
compensation idea. Although ACUS recommended that public partici-
pation in agency proceedings be substantially expanded and that poor 
persons be reimbursed for the costs of their involvement in rulemak-
ing,11 the ACUS's members ultimately voted against widespread appli-
6. See Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Par1it:Ipa1ion in 1he Admin-
istrative Process, 60 GEO. LJ. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Participa1ion in Adminislralfre Pr<>-
ceedings, 81 YALE LJ. 359 (1972); Stewart, supra note 4. 
7. See Cramton, supra note 6, at 529-30; Tobias, supra note 4, at 908. 
8. 3 SENATE CO~IM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATIOS: Pueuc 
PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, s. Doc. No. 71, 95th Cong., 1st Scss. 
vii, 17-22 (1977) [hereinafter SENATE STUDY]; see also Gellhorn, supra note 6, at 389-98 (cost 
estimates). 
9. See, e.g., SENATE STUDY, supra note 8, at 1·22, 91-127; Public Participation in Federal 
Agency Proceedings Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 270 Before the Subcomm. on Adminlslratfre 
Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Isl Scss. (1977) [here-
inafter S. 270 Hearings]. 
IO. Reimbursement is only one response, of course, to the perceived difficulties which arc only 
one set of problems with modern administrative governance. For analyses of other difficulties and 
proposed solutions, see the sources cited supra notes 6, 8, & 9, and the papers in A Symposium on 
Administrative Law, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Admlnlslrali~·e Agencies, 36 ;\.\t 
U.L. REV. 277 (1987). 
11. The first recommendation was entitled Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaklng 
of Direct Consequence to Them, in 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. 1968-70, at 71 (1970) (recommendation no. 5). The second recom-
mendation was entitled Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, in 2 AoMIStsTRATIVE 
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cation of the funding concept.12 The FTC invoked implied authority to 
compensate public participants in a 1972 hearing.13 The FTC premised 
the action on an opinion of the Comptroller General that it could val-
idly exercise such power.14 The Comptroller, who is the head of the 
General Accounting Office, an entity established to serve as Congress's 
watchdog of the agencies, confirmed in many later decisions that nu-
merous other federal agencies possessed similar authority.16 
In the 1970s, Congress specifically granted several agencies the 
power to fund participants.16 Since the middle of that decade, it has 
relied on appropriations measures to instruct agencies that they can 
reimburse participants.17 During the 1980s, however, Congress more 
often used those statutes to inform agencies that they were not to com-
pensate.16 In 1985, the legislature made permanent the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA), which permits entities like small businesses that 
prevail against the government in certain proceedings to recover their 
fees and expenses.19 
Between 1972 and approximately 1982, fourteen governmental en-
tities employed express or implied authority to fund citizens who par-
ticipated in their administrative processes. More than half of these gov-
ernmental units reimbursed the public in less than four proceedings.20 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS & REP. 1970·72, at 444 (1972) (Ap-
pendix; Recommendation 28) (hereinafter Admin. Conf Rec. 28]. 
12. See Admin. Conf Rec. 28, supra note 11. 
13. See In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 1032 (1972); see also Tobias, supra 
note 3, at 1104-05 (more discussion of FTC consideration of funding). 
14. See Letter from Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General, to Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Chair· 
man, FTC (Aug. 10, 1972), reprinted in Public Participation in Federal Agency Proceedings: 
Hearings on S. 2715 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1976). 
15. See, e.g., Letter from R. F. Keller, Deputy Comptroller General, to Rep. John E. Moss, 
Chairman, Oversight and Investigations Subcomm., Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
(May 10, 1976), reprinted in S. 270 Hearings, supra note 9, pt. I at 428; see also Tobias, supra 
note 4, at 912-14 (more discussion of Comptroller's opinions). 
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2) (1976) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); IS U.S.C. § 
57a(h) (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(4) (1976) (EPA); 22 U.S.C. § 2692 (Supp. III 1979) 
(Department of State). 
17. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 242, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1979). 
18. See, e.g., Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 96-514, 94 Stat. 2957, 2976 (1980); Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99·160, § 410, 99 Stat. 
909, 931 ( 1985). 
19. See Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985); see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 1106 n.29 
(more discussion of EAJA and its background). 
20. For a thorough discussion and documentation of the funding, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 
1106-09. 
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The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the FfC, and the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ran the 
most ambitious programs in the federal government; in more than fif-
teen initiatives, each paid individuals and organizations which were in-
volved.21 Nearly all agencies ceased compensating participants by 1982 
because of adverse judicial decisions involving funding, "antiregulatory 
reaction, budget-cutting, and bureaucratic caution."22 
The political perspective of the particular presidential administra-
tion in power at the time has affected the frequency of reimbursement. 
Only a small number of governmental entities compensated members of 
the public in the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations. The over-
whelming majority of reimbursement activity occurred during the years 
of the Carter administration.23 Moreover, President Carter was the sole 
president to endorse the participant funding concept expressly.2" 
The federal courts, in three cases, have considered the question of 
agency implied authority.211 The Second Circuit, in a closely divided en 
bane decision, refused to order that the Federal Power Commission pay 
expenses intervenors incurred in a licensing proceeding.26 A District of 
Columbia district court found that the Agriculture Department pos-
sessed implied power to fund a public interest organization which ana-
lyzed the economic effects of an agency proposal.27 Finally, a sharply 
divided panel of the Fourth Circuit held that "whether there shall be 
reimbursement for public participation in agency proceedings is a deci-
sion for Congress and not the FDA or this court."28 
21. The Department of State also funded in more than 15 initiatives, but the procccdinss were 
less complex. For a discussion of these agencies' funding, sec Tobias, supra note 3, at 1107·08. 
22. Tobias, supra note 4, at 955; see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 1108·09 (discussion of 
program discontinuation). 
23. For a discussion and documentation of the funding, sec Tobias, supra note 3. at 1106-09. 
24. He recognized the "need for public participation funding and [strongly encouraged) each 
department and agency with the requisite authority to institute a public p:irlicip:ition funding 
program." J. Carter, Memorandum for the Heads of faecutive Departments and Agencies from 
President Carter, May 16, 1979, l 1979 PUB. PAPERS, at 867 (1980). 
25. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981); Greene County Planning 
Bd. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1237 (2d Cir. 1976) (en bane) (denying petitions for review and 
remanding to FPC for determination whether FPC should compensate intervcnors' expenses under 
standards approved by Comptroller General, holding that it is for Congress, not Comptroller Gen-
eral, "to set the conditions under which payments, if any, should be made") (June 30, 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 {1978); Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dcp'l of Agric., 459 F. 
Supp. 216 (D.D.C. 1978). For a thorough analysis of these opinions and of the issue of implied 
funding authority, see Tobias, supra note 4, al 918-39. 
26. Greene County Planning Bd., 559 F.2d al 1239. 
27. Chamber of Commerce at 221. 
28. Pacific Legal Found. v. Goyan, 664 F.2d 1221, 1227 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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Although the concept of reimbursed public involvement emerged 
nearly two decades ago, there has been no comprehensive assessment of 
its advantages and disadvantages, effectiveness or quality.20 Five agen-
cies' funding activity was never analyzed.30 Six governmental units per-
formed self-studies which can be criticized principally because they ap-
parently were prepared as advocacy documents meant to convince 
Congress that publicly supported citizen activity was worthwhile.31 
Some outside evaluators have examined a small quantity of compen-
sated participation.32 Moreover, while there is considerable congres-
sional testimony concerning such participation, much of it appears to 
be motivated by political factors.33 
In short, numerous governmental entities have sponsored the in-
volvement of some 500 members of the public in nearly 100 agency 
proceedings. Although a considerable amount of that compensated par-
ticipation has not been analyzed, a sufficient quantity has been assessed 
to ascertain whether the reimbursement concept should be revitalized. 
The benefits and detriments of funded citizen involvement are ex-
amined below. 
II. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PARTICIPANT 
COMPENSATION 
It is neither possible nor necessary to provide a comprehensive as-
sessment of all of the compensated participation that occurred. 34 The 
overwhelming majority of reimbursed involvement was in proceedings 
conducted a decade ago, and the memories of those familiar with the 
funded activity may well be unreliable.35 There is, however, considera-
ble secondary material that was contemporaneously reduced to writing 
and remains comparatively accessible.38 Information from some pri-
29. This should not be surprising, given the substantial funding activity that occurred and the 
difficulties entailed in its analysis. For a discussion of prior studies, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 
1110-12, 1116-17. 
30. See id. at 1110 n.57. These were the agencies which funded in few proceedings. See s11pra 
note 20 and accompanying text. 
31. Tobias, supra note 3, at 1110-11 & nn.59-60. 
32. Id. at 1111. 
33. Id. at 1111-12. 
34. The sheer magnitude of the task would be overwhelming, given the substantial amount of 
funding activity. 
35. For a discussion of the problems posed by passage of time, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 
1125-26. 
36. This includes the material discussed supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. See also 
Tobias, supra note 3, at 1121-22 (discussion of difficulties entailed in treating that material). 
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mary sources also exists.37 These data constitute a sufficiently reliable 
and representative basis on which to premise conclusions about whether 
participant compensation was promising enough to warrant revitaliza-
tion.38 The question of revitalization implicates issues of economics and 
politics at least as much as it involves reimbursement's potential, espe-
cially in terms of the efficacy and quality of the public involvement 
promoted. 39 
A. Advantages 
Government sponsored citizen participation in administrative pro-
ceedings afforded numerous advantages at each stage of decisionmak-
ing.40 Funded individuals and groups facilitated expeditious, accurate, 
and equitable agency treatment of questions at issue. They identified 
and clarified the problems, interests, and alternatives that administra-
tive officials must consider and offered information and points of view 
that might otherwise have been unavailable. Moreover, they aided deci-
sionmakers in analyzing the input before them and contributed to more 
defensible policy formulation. 
During the early phases of decisional processes, reimbursed par-
ticipants helped to set the stage for prompt, efficacious decisionmaking. 
Those who were funded delineated the interests that would be affected 
by agency determinations and how they would be affected, expansively 
identified and clearly assessed the issues to be resolved, and denomi-
nated a broad spectrum of possible options for administrative consider-
ation.41 Compensation permitted governmental officials to solicit di-
rectly the views of a broader range of affected parties and, thus, 
37. For a discussion of certain problems involved in gleaning information from primary 
sources, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 1122-25. 
38. For a discussion of reliability and representativeness in the conte:<t or detailed analysis at 
one agency which yielded the conclusion that funding was sufficiently promising to warrant reo.i-
talization, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 1118-28, 1162-63. 
39. Professor Boyer, who, under the auspices or the ACUS, conducted the most sophisticated 
analysis of funding, found that reimbursement clearly had sufficient promise to warrant reinstitu-
tion and that considerable controversy involving the concept implicated politics and economics. 
See B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants in Administrative Rulemaking: The Federal 
Trade Commission Experience (ACUS June 1980) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with 
author) [hereinafter B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants]. The condensed, more accessi-
ble version of his study is Boyer, Funding Public Participation in Agency Proceedings: The Fed-
eral Trade Commission Experience, 70 GEO. LJ. 51 (1981). 
40. Here I rely, in a general sense and for specific examples, on my earlier work and the 
primary sources on which it is based, attempting, insofar as possible, to be representative. See 
Tobias, supra note 4, at 941-55. 
41. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1157; Tobias, supra note 4, at 941-42. 
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enhanced decisionmakers' understanding of their determinations' actual 
implications.42 
After reimbursed persons and entities had helped to establish ef-
fective frameworks for administrative decisionmaking, they improved 
agency processes by submitting novel information, by making new con-
tentions, and by offering different perspectives on issues under consider-
ation.43 Funded participants provided perceptive points of view on the 
procedural and substantive aspects of legal questions. For instance, one 
compensated entity recommended that the Department of Transporta-
tion subpoena necessary data from industry members,44 while another 
helped flesh out the meaning of a general standard included in the leg-
islation governing the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).45 Reimbursed participants also supplied administrative deci-
sionmakers with raw information they did not have and which was nec-
essary to reach the most accurate determinations.46 These officers as-
serted as well that funded parties developed data, proffered evidence 
and performed surveys that substantially improved the records com-
piled in agency proceedings while helping the officials to organize and 
control the records more effectively.47 
42. For example, two FTC chairmen found that funding substantially enriched agency deci· 
sionmaking by providing a diversity of perspectives. See Regulatory Reform: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 
!st Sess. pt. 2 at 196-97 (1979) (statement of FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk) [hereinafter 
Regulatory Reform Hearings]. 
43. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1157; Tobias, supra note 4, at 942-43. 
44. See DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM TO PROVIDE FINAN· 
CIAL ASSISTANCE TO PARTICIPANTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: NHTSA's EVALUATIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (1977) (on file with author) [hereinafter NHTSA STUDY]. 
45. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 42, pt. 2 at 169 (statement of Mass. Lieu· 
tenant Governor Thomas O'Neill III). The participant convinced HUD that its calculations of 
utility charges would unduly burden those living in public housing, and, as a consequence, the 
agency significantly reduced its figures. Id. 
46. For instance, a compensated organization "identified an extremely hazardous product, free 
form asbestos" that CPSC staff did not know was available commercially. The staff in turn for· 
warded the information to the Commission's product recall branch for investigation. See MEMO· 
RANDUM: FUNDING UNDER 1980 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROGRAM 4 (1980) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter CPSC STUDY]. That entity also informed the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) of polychlorinated biphenyls' application-of which the agency was unaware-in micros· 
copy, and that information led EPA to exclude such use from its rule. See OFFICE OF TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PCB PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PILOT 
SUMMARY (1978) (on file with author). 
47. For assertions that records were improved, see S. 270 Hearings, supra note 9, pt. I at 7 
(statement of James De Long, Assistant Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection); Regula-
tory Reform Hearings, supra note 42, pt. 2 at 177, 197 (statement of NHTSA Administrator 
Claybrook); see also id. at 197 (statement of FTC Chairman Pertsehuk) (helping officials organ· 
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Government sponsored participants suggested, created, and em-
ployed new approaches to testing and assessment. These participants 
also criticized and enhanced the mechanisms, procedures, and reason-
ing processes of other parties and administrative staffers. Correspond-
ingly, compensated entities applied novel and improved techniques and 
methodologies to produce valuable information. For example, in a 
home heating oil proceeding before the Department of Energy, a 
funded individual convinced the agency that a Department of Justice 
assessment of competition among refiners was inaccurate, enhanced the 
Energy Department's evaluative approaches by applying different infor-
mation, and developed the preferred model of industry overcharges."8 
Reimbursed parties helped agencies thoroughly consider alterna-
tive courses of action while creating and recommending different, less 
burdensome, and novel ways of attaining agency purposes. They also 
persuaded decisionmakers to implement these approaches. For instance, 
in the FfC's hybrid rulemaking on used cars, Commission staff ini-
tially recommended comprehensive disclosure requirements."9 At the 
instigation of a compensated organization whose survey indicated that 
consumers wanted less complex regulations, the FTC altered its propo-
sal to reflect the organization's ideas.110 
Of course, the federal agencies relied on many additional sugges-
tions of those funded in testing, reaching, and supporting their ultimate 
determinations.111 In numerous circumstances when reimbursed entities 
did not change decisionmakers' perspectives or their proposed ap-
proaches, the groups enhanced decisional processes. Cogent input sup-
portive of agencies' ideas afforded assurance that they were correct and 
bolstered administrative resolve to resist criticism, especially from in-
dustry representatives which otherwise might have been accommodated 
too greatly.112 Compensated participants who questioned agency view-
ize and control records). 
48. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS. DECISION AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS No. 2, [HOME] HEATING OIL 81, 84, 126 (Nov. 29, 1978) (on file with author). 
Similarly, a funded party's challenges to data tendered by a drug comp:my seeking FDA appnwal 
of aspartame supported in part the Board of Public Inquiry's recommendation that there be addi-
tional testing related to cancer before approval. See 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285-86 (1981). 
49. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 42, pt. 2 at 227-28 (statement of Nancy 
Drabble). 
50. Id. at 228. See generally 46 Fed. Reg. 41,328 (1981). One person funded to sp:ak at a 
CPSC hearing offered similar valuable suggestions for alternative courses of action that were im-
plemented by the staff. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1149-50. 
51. For more examples, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 1128-56; Tobias, supra note 4, at 941-45. 
52. See NHTSA STUDY, supra note 44, at 2; cf. Tobias, supra note 3, at 1102-03 (discussion 
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points demanded rational answers while requiring agency staffers to do 
their homework and keeping administrative officials honest.Gs Some 
have even contended that funded input which lacks substantive efficacy 
may be beneficial. For instance, one FTC commissioner provided these 
observations on reimbursed parties: "[I]n most instances, their position 
did not prevail. And yet there's not been an occasion in which they 
didn't sharpen the analysis ... at times, their positions may be ex-
treme, but they expose considerations which would not otherwise come 
to the surface. "114 
The efficacy of compensated involvement cannot be separated 
completely from its quality, that is, how good the government spon-
sored activity was. It appears that funded participation was of respecta-
ble quality. Professor Boyer, who thoroughly analyzed reimbursed or-
ganizations' representation in many FTC hybrid rulemakings, found 
that the entities made respectable showings.1111 The conclusions of the 
ACUS, under whose auspices he conducted the study, were much 
stronger: 
[R]eimbursed participants in the Commission's proceedings 
have provided a variety of viewpoints and information on rele-
vant issues that would not otherwise have been presented 
. . . [,] developed empirical data which was useful to the 
Commission; effectively cross-examined witnesses presented by 
other parties and by staff, and presented expert testimony.116 
Moreover, the NHTSA stated that compensated groups "were able to 
make a meaningful contribution."117 Most of the funded input was sub-
stantively correct. Reimbursed individuals offered pertinent, substanti-
ated information, contentions and viewpoints that had not been pro-
vided. Consequently, they necessarily delineated, and instigated 
examination of, issues that would not have been considered. Compen-
of agency bias toward regulated interests). 
53. See Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 42, pt. 2 at 174-200 (testimony of FTC 
Chairman Pertschuk and NHTSA Administrator Claybrook). 
54. Authorizations for the FTC: Hearings on S. 1020 Before the Subcomm.for Consumers of 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14·15 (1979) 
(statement of Commissioner Pitofsky); cf. NHTSA STUDY, supra note 44, at 13 (demonstrably 
inaccurate funded input enabled agency to rebut views of airbag critics). Of course, compensated 
contributions that improve decisionmaking can afford ancillary advantages, such as saving agency 
resources and time. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 945 n.229. 
55. See B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants, supra note 39, at 145. 
56. 1 C.F.R. § 305.80·81 (1988). 
57. NHTSA STUDY, supra note 44, at I. 
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sated groups lucidly and effectively explained and supported their per-
spectives, questioned and required justifications for views with which 
they disagreed, and vigorously and equitably discussed the concepts 
adduced. 
Public funding afforded several advantages that pertain less closely 
to administrative decisionmaking. Reimbursement promoted the in-
volvement of individuals and entities, such as grass roots citizens' orga-
nizations and trade associations, which previously bad been unable to 
participate or had little involvement in agency proceedings. Compensa-
tion also helped to remedy imbalances in information and viewpoints 
that decisionmakers received, while it enabled members of the public to 
participate more on a par with regulated interests.118 
B. Disadvantages 
Participant funding had a number of detrimental implications, 
however. Considerable evidence suggests that certain reimbursed par-
ties had little or no effect on agency determinations, provided inaccu-
rate or mediocre input, or posed problems related less directly to deci-
sional processes. These difficulties deserve more cursory examination 
than the benefits of participant compensation for several reasons. Con-
siderably more funded activity was relatively efficacious and of compar-
atively high quality than was not, while practically all of the involve-
ment afforded some benefit more removed from decisionmaking.119 
Moreover, reimbursement permitted the public to make contributions 
whose quality was similar to input of other parties or mechanisms for 
promoting citizen participation or enhancing agency decisions.6° Fur-
thermore, there were apparently fewer disadvantages than benefits as 
an absolute matter, although this is extremely controversial and very 
difficult to gauge.61 
Certain compensated submissions were erroneous or unsubstanti-
58. For more discussion of the ideas in this paragraph, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 1158; 
Tobias, supra note 4, at 945, 950-51. 
59. I premise these propositions, on a government-wide basis, upon Tobias, s11pra note 4, at 
941-55. See also Tobias, supra note 3, at 1158-59 (funded participation's relative and compara-
tive value at CPSC). 
60. Funding enabled the public to have more beneficial, and fewer detrimental, impacts on 
decisional processes, and more advantageous, and fewer adverse, effects more removed from dcci-
sionmaking than these other parties and measures. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1159. 
61. These are estimates based on prior work, especially Professor Boyer's and mine. For a look 
at one agency, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 1158-59. One complication is that there is relatively 
little documentation of funding's negative aspects. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 945. 
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ated, while additional contributions replicated the input of other par-
ticipants or were of average or poor quality. Several agencies consid-
ered evaluations, surveys, or models tendered by funded organizations 
to be flawed in important ways,62 which had the concomitant detrimen-
tal implication of delaying proceedings' resolution.63 Another substan-
tial criticism of reimbursed participants was that they supplied data, 
relied on testing techniques or made contentions that additional parties 
or the agency staff provided while subscribing to proposals or views 
already formulated by the agencies. For example, I found that compen-
sated individuals submitted considerable duplicative information and 
arguments in several of the ten CPSC proceedings in which they were 
involved.64 
Some funded activity was of average or inferior quality.0 G Certain 
reimbursed participants were unable to present their ideas clearly or to 
advocate their positions persuasively. Other compensated individuals 
failed to prepare, were disorganized, naive, or impractical, or were so 
aggressive and uncompromising that they lacked effectiveness. 
Public funding did not always foster participation by those who 
had previously been involved minimally in agency proceedings, reduce 
imbalanced participation, or expand the perspectives received by agen-
cies.66 Considerable reimbursement went to individuals and groups that 
had contributed to earlier agency initiatives without government pay-
ment. Correspondingly, much funding was paid to a comparatively 
small group of applicants. Many of these applicants participated in sev-
eral matters at a single agency. A few of these applicants were com-
pensated even after they had previously received reimbursement for 
providing deficient input. 
62. The agencies were DOE, ITC, and NHTSA. For discussion of the flawed input, see To-
bias, supra note 4, at 946-47. 
63. Delay was one of the major criticisms leveled at the funding concept. See, e.g., S. 270 
Hearings, supra note 9, at 113-14 (statement of William Cuddy). 
64. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1134-35, 1146-52. For additional examples of the submission 
of duplicative input at other agencies and the contention that funded citizens were not particularly 
helpful in generating original technical or scientific information, see Tobias, supra note 4, at 946. 
65. For specific examples of the phenomena discussed in this paragraph, sec Tobias, s11pra 
note 3, at 1128-56. 
66. For more discussion and specific examples of some of the phenomena discussed in this 
paragraph, see Tobias, supra note 4, at 947. 
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C. Cost-Effectiveness 
A highly controversial, but perhaps paramount, question that must 
be asked about government-sponsored public participation is whether it 
was cost-effective. The attempt to answer this question implicates is-
sues of efficacy and quality and the disadvantages examined above, as 
well as questions of the expenses entailed in participant funding. 
1. Prospects For Improvement 
As seen already, compensated involvement had numerous advanta-
geous impacts that were manifested at each phase of agency decision-
making, and the quality of most reimbursed activity was respectable. 
Funded participation was comparatively efficacious and of relatively 
high quality. Moreover, government compensation allowed the public to 
provide input of a quality similar to other contributors or measures for 
enhancing non-commercial involvement or for improving agency deci-
sions. Thus, while the benefits appear to outweigh the detriments, a 
significant question that remains is whether the disadvantages observed 
can be remedied or ameliorated.67 
It now seems that numerous problems can be rectified or their 
magnitude reduced. Many of the disadvantages encountered can be 
ascribed fairly to agency experimentation with a comparatively novel 
concept for facilitating citizen participation in administrative proceed-
ings. At the time government reimbursement was effectively discontin-
ued, most agencies were taking steps to enhance, or had substantially 
improved, the quality of funding program administration.68 These re-
finements assumed a number of forms. By the early 1980s, numerous 
agencies were exhibiting more sophistication and selectivity in choosing 
recipients of compensation. Several agencies appeared to scrutinize 
more closely the performance of those reimbursed, while others denied 
applications submitted by persons whose prior input had been inade-
quate.69 A few agencies instituted outreach efforts to notify prospective 
67. I merely am saying that because the benefits seem greater than the disad\'antagcs, it 
makes sense to see whether the disadvantages can be remedied or reduced. 
68. Program operation was the major focus of funding's critics, Tobias, supra note 4, at 945, 
and numerous difficulties were encountered in running the new programs. See id. at 947; see also 
B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants, supra note 39 (thorough assessment of program 
administration). 
69. See B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants, supra note 39, at 95 (by mid-1979, fi. 
nancial auditing aspects of FfC's program seemed relatively wen established); see also Tobias, 
supra note 4, at 948 n.249 (more discussion of other agencies' elTorts). 
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participants that they might be eligible for funding.70 Some agencies 
attempted to time compensation grants in ways that would enable those 
selected to prepare for participation and, thus, not delay substantive 
administrative decisionmaking. 71 
It is important to understand, however, that there may be certain 
limitations on such refinements. Intrinsic to soliciting input from those 
with less experience than industry or the agency is that some contribu-
tions will lack validity or be duplicative.72 Concomitantly, the relatively 
small number of potential applicants with the requisite expertise to par-
ticipate effectively at specific agencies may restrict efforts to expand 
the participant base.73 
2. Actual Costs 
The actual expense of public funding may be compelling for a 
cost-conscious Congress and administration, given the substantial 
budget deficits.74 The amount spent on administering reimbursement 
programs and on payments to participants appears to have been reason-
able. Only a single agency expended more than $65,000 in one year, 
while numerous agencies actually spent much less than they initially 
earmarked for reimbursement.711 
Considerable evidence suggests that the cost of compensating par-
70. See, e.g., B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants, supra note 39, at 85 (discussing 
FfC); see also I C.F.R. § 305.79-5 (1981) (ACUS recommendations for facilitating funded par-
ticipation by the FfC). 
71. Some agencies' failure to do so had given funded parties too little time to prepare or had 
led them to provide duplicative input because they lacked awareness of others' submissions. For 
more discussion of these problems and agency efforts to treat them, sec Tobias, supra note 4, at 
948-49. 
72. It is impractical to expect all funded entities to provide brilliant new insight that improves 
every agency decision or to expect that "lay" consumers will have the expertise of an engineer who 
has been working in the relevant industry for 20 years. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 950. 
73. It may be preferable, for instance, to award funding to those who have demonstrated their 
proficiency in prior proceedings. See B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants, supra note 39, 
at 129. Cost and other practical problems also may require compromise in other areas, such as 
evaluating applicants' fiscal condition or recipients' funded input. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 
951. In short, some of the difficulties discussed in this subsection may be ascribed to nascent 
experimentation with a novel procedure while others may be "fixed" costs of an otherwise valuable 
endeavor. See id. at 946 n.232. 
74. For estimates of program institution and daily operation costs at several agencies, sec To-
bias, supra note 4, at 952 nn.267 & 269. These estimates are from 1981. 
75. The FfC was the sole agency to spend more than $65,000 annually, while most spent 
much less. See Tobias, supra note 4, at 952-53 & nn.271 & 272. The FDA spent $7,300 of 
$250,000 allocated for one year, while CPSC spent $28,400 of $150,000. See id. at 953 n.272. 
Some agencies even paid out less than they awarded applicants initially. See id. 
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ticular participants was comparatively small in several respects. Nu-
merous agencies paid lawyers and technical experts at levels signifi-
cantly less than market value for identical services in the private 
sector.76 Funding also was cheaper than the other options typically used 
to secure greater extra-agency input.77 Reimbursed parties inexpen-
sively augmented the efforts of staff, enabling the agencies to draw on 
outside experience in areas where they did not wish to develop costly 
internal expertise.78 Correspondingly, compensated participants were 
cheaper than external contractors, because they often had considerable 
experience in their fields of interest, were strongly motivated, or were 
willing or able to work for less money.79 
D. Summary 
In short, funded involvement had numerous advantageous impacts 
throughout decisionmaking processes, afforded many benefits more re-
moved from agency decisions, and was of respectable quality. Reim-
bursed activity also had some deleterious effects on decisionmaking, 
lacked quality, and imposed disadvantages related less closely to deci-
sional processes. Most of these detrimental aspects, however, can be 
rectified or are amenable to amelioration. Moreover, participant com-
pensation was cheap generally and was inexpensive in contrast to other 
measures for securing decisional data. Participant funding, therefore, 
seems to be sufficiently cost-effective and valuable to deserve revitaliza-
tion and ongoing experimentation in properly delineated circumstances. 
76. See B. Boyer, Compensating Public Participants, supra note 39, at 91 (discussing rec scale 
for lawyers); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,485 (1977) (FTC) (pegging experts' fees to salaries or go\·crnmcnl 
employees having similar experience). 
77. These options are augmentation of agency staff and hiring external governmental 
contractors. 
78. See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Transportation of the House Appropriations Comm., 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. pt. 6, at 287 (1979) (statement of Reuben Robertson, CAB Bureau or Consumer Protec· 
tion Director); H.R. REP. No. 1164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 9434, 9440 (funded participation less expensive than staff augmentation: 
direct use of consumer resources and expertise would permit CPSC to bootstrap agency staff on 
technical issues which should yield better standards). 
79. For instance, CPSC staff said that a compensated entity's expenditures in completing a 
study were one-tenth what a contractor would have charged. See CPSC STUDY, supra note 46, at 
2; see also Regulatory Reform Hearings, supra note 42, at 188 (statement of NHTSA Adminis-
trator Claybrook) (funded parties' experience, cost-effectiveness, and motivation): Tobias, supra 
note 3, at 1158 n.368 (CPSC program cheap because industry rcprcsentati\·es donated SCf\iccs 
and technical experts were paid less than usual rates). 
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III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVITALIZATION AND CONTINUED 
EXPERIMENTATION 
Congress, the Bush administration, and the administrative agen-
cies ought to revitalize participant reimbursement and should experi-
ment with the concept in appropriately tailored situations. Much has 
changed since the heady, early days when there was widespread imple-
mentation of the compensation concept. Astronomical budget deficits 
have restricted even the most vital governmental programs. Many 
members of the electorate have indicated their preference for a more 
limited federal role. Moreover, deregulation has enjoyed considerable, 
albeit declining, popularity. Nevertheless, several factors have re-
mained constant, and perhaps have become more compelling, over that 
period, especially agency need for the highest quality, best balanced 
input in order to make the most well-informed decisions on issues af-
fecting the lives of millions of Americans. It is this need that govern-
ment funding fulfills. 
This is not a call for the wholesale imposition of stringent regula-
tory controls.80 It also is not a plea for government-wide institution of 
reimbursement programs. Indeed, a considerably more circumscribed 
approach was indicated by the half-decade of rigorous experimentation 
with participant compensation. That experience illustrated that the 
funding endeavors were insufficiently successful to warrant broad-scale 
revitalization but that the efforts were effective enough to support ex-
perimentation in carefully chosen contexts. Moreover, the five years of 
relatively intensive work with the reimbursement concept afford much 
instructive guidance for reviving compensation.81 
There should be selective experimentation at an adequate number 
of agencies, over sufficient time, in enough contexts to afford diversity, 
representativeness, and a fair test of funding's workability. Because the 
benefits and disadvantages of participant reimbursement vary signifi-
cantly in specific situations, and because there were substantial discrep-
ancies among agencies in compensation program administration, fund-
ing should be tried in a healthy mix of circumstances. For example, 
80. Although the topic is beyond the scope of this article, selective "reregulation" may now be 
advisable. See Tobias, The Deregulation Dilemma, The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 13, 1989, 
at 18; see also Regulation Symposium (Part/), 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1245 (1988), Regula-
tion Symposium (Part II), 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. I (1989). 
81. This time span, from about 1976 to 1981, roughly parallels the Carter administration, 
during which the overwhelming majority of reimbursed activity occurred. See supra notes 23·24 
and accompanying text. 
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experimentation might proceed in agencies and in contexts in which 
prior experience was successful, appeared to hold promise or in which 
no funding occurred. a2 
Agencies that might contemplate the reinstitution of compensation 
should systematically consider that possibility. They ought to study 
previous experience with reimbursement and ascertain how funding can 
yield the greatest number of benefits.83 The governmental units should 
establish compensation efforts that are modest in scope; that maximize 
opportunities for innovation, refinement, and tinkering; and that are at-
tentive to the specifics of program operation.a• In performing the par-
ticular task of designating reimbursement recipients, agencies ought to 
remember that decisionmaking is more likely to be improved when: 1) 
the government is very receptive to, and has considerable need for, citi-
zen input; and 2) those funded are especially able to fulfill that need.a11 
Moreover, agencies must be sure that they have adequate resources to 
operate the reimbursement programs efficiently and to enable compen-
sated parties to participate meaningfully.as Governmental entities that 
do not have adequate resources or express funding power may want to 
petition Congress for both.a7 
Congress should be receptive to these requests. It ought to afford 
the requisite money in appropriations legislation. Congress also should 
explicitly provide for compensation in substantive statutes after assess-
ing previous experimentation and designating appropriate circum-
stances for future work. Should the legislative branch fail to prescribe 
agency reimbursement specifically in authorizing statutes, Congress 
82. The funding experiences of CPSC, FDA, and NHTSA were relatively su~ful, while 
FDA's program was particularly well run. Compensation also should be tried at new agencies and 
in novel situations. 
83. Agencies can learn much from prior experimentation; however, so much time has p:issed 
since funding's effective discontinuation that comparatively little collective expertise remains at 
most agencies. 
84. The most helpful work on agency program operation remains B. Boyer, Compensating 
Public Participants, supra note 39. 
85. I found agency receptivity and need and participants' ability to be the parameters most 
important to effective participation. For an analysis of these parameters and others, see Tobias, 
supra note 3, at 1159-60. 
86. If agencies do not award applicants adequate funding, this failure can jeopardize the cffi· 
cacy and quality of participation. See Tobias, supra note 3, at 1160-61. When agencies have 
insufficient resources for program operation, the quality of applicant selection and recipient C\-alu· 
ation can suffer. 
87. I have argued that agency implied power is sufficiently capacious to support funding. See 
Tobias, supra note 4. Agencies, of course, will be more comfortable operating specifically author· 
ized programs. 
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ought to eliminate proscriptions in appropriations measures. 
If Congress decides not to grant agencies specific compensation 
power, the governmental units themselves may wish to rely on implied 
authority to establish modest reimbursement programs. As long as 
these endeavors are moderately scaled, effectively administered, and 
benefit the agencies, the legislature ought to promote the experiments 
or at least let them proceed.ss Correspondingly, the federal judiciary 
should invalidate programs created pursuant to implied authority only 
when the agencies clearly are acting beyond the scope of their power.so 
The participation that is funded should be evaluated rigorously.00 
There should be close scrutiny of a considerable amount of compen-
sated activity or a representative sample over enough time to provide 
statistical validity.91 Those conducting studies ought to be independent 
of the agencies undergoing assessment but have considerable familiar-
ity with their processes and the reimbursement concept. 02 Prime candi-
dates for this responsibility are the General Accounting Office and the 
ACUS. Once evaluators have analyzed the funded involvement that oc-
curs, they ought to try to reach more conclusive determinations about 
its advantages and disadvantages. 
CONCLUSION 
During the half-decade in which the federal government actively 
experimented with participant compensation, the citizen involvement 
supported had many salutary effects throughout administrative agency 
decisional processes. It also afforded numerous benefits related less di-
rectly to decisionmaking and was of respectable quality. Perhaps most 
significant for a budget-conscious Congress and administration, public 
reimbursement apparently was cost-effective. Congress and the Bush 
administration should now reinstitute participant funding in those 
agencies and administrative proceedings in which it is likely to prove 
88. Of course, Congress can provide most efficiently for funding's revitalization, because it can 
analyze systematically earlier experimentation and designate proper situations for future work. 
Congress at least should eliminate proscriptions imposed on some agencies in appropriations stat· 
utes. Correspondingly, if Congress does not wish to appropriate money specifically for funding, it 
might let agencies draw on their general appropriations in light of agencies' views of funding's 
worth relative to other initiatives. 
89. For an analysis of agency implied funding authority, see Tobias, supra note 4. 
90. For a discussion of rigorous evaluation, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 1118·28, 1164. 
91. For discussions of what to analyze, representativeness, and statistical validity, see Tobias, 
supra note 3, at 1118-20, 1121-25, 1127-28. 
92. For a more comprehensive discussion of by whom, as well as how, when, and where, these 
studies should be conducted, see Tobias, supra note 3, at 1120-21, 1125-28, 1164. 
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most beneficial while providing for rigorous future experimentation 
with the compensation concept. 
